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SYMPOSIUM: THE 19TH AMENDMENT AT 100: FROM THE
VOTE TO GENDER EQUALITY 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NINETEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE DECADE
FOLLOWING RATIFICATION 
Paula A. Monopoli* 
As we gather at the Center for Constitutional Law’s Symposium, The 
Nineteenth Amendment at 100: From the Vote to Gender Equality, I am 
struck by the recurring themes around American women and their 
government.1 Recently, the media has focused on the rift between the first 
female Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, and new 
member, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. This division is 
reminiscent of the generational split in the suffrage movement between 
Carrie Chapman Catt and Alice Paul—a split that I would argue helps us 
understand the limited constitutional development of the Nineteenth 
Amendment in the decade following its ratification. 
Like Pelosi, Catt was the older of the two women and more 
strategically and tactically conservative than the younger suffragist, Paul. 
Trained in the more radical tactics of the British Women’s Social and 
Political Union, Paul was impatient with the elder Catt’s focus on a state-
by-state strategy for winning suffrage. Like Ocasio-Cortez has done vis-
a-vis Pelosi, Paul engaged Catt directly, pushing the National American 
* Sol & Carlyn Hubert Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. Visiting
Scholar, Moller Institute, Churchill College, University of Cambridge. The author’s scholarship on 
the intersection of gender and the Constitution includes CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN: GENDER 
EQUALITY AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2020) from Oxford University Press 
and Gender and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L. J. 2643 (2006) reprinted in GENDER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (C. MacKinnon ed. 2018). The author would like to thank Reva Siegel, Tracy 
Thomas, Elizabeth Katz and the other symposium participants for their thoughtful comments. She 
would also like to thank Susan G. McCarty and Matthew A. Brown for their editorial assistance with 
this paper. 
1. “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
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Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) to embrace a more radical 
position. In Paul’s case, that position was that a federal amendment was 
the right way to the ballot and that civil disobedience was an appropriate 
tactic to achieve that result. Paul subsequently broke with NAWSA to 
form the National Woman’s Party (NWP). And, much as Catt finally had 
to move toward Paul’s position and support the federal amendment, Pelosi 
has recently had to move toward Ocasio-Cortez’s position to hold a formal 
impeachment inquiry.2 
We also see echoes of the suffrage movement in the racism and 
xenophobia currently being weaponized against women exercising 
political power. The same antagonism toward immigrants and African 
Americans that animated much of the discourse around women voting—
with some suffragists exploiting that fear and arguing that white women’s 
votes would be useful in cancelling out those of uneducated immigrants 
and black voters—is still deployed for political purposes today. And 
women raising their voices in the public sphere still trigger visceral male 
reactions, as did the early suffragists who dared lecture in public and 
picket the White House during a time of war. In July 2019, the President 
of the United States attacked four Congresswomen on Twitter, all of 
whom were women of color. He suggested the representatives were non-
native born and should “go back and help fix the totally broken and crime 
infested places from which they came.”3 This extreme and unfounded 
attack reminds us that when women dare to exercise political power, they 
still face the same threatening pushback visited on suffragists organizing 
and protesting for the vote prior to 1920. Finally, recent debates about 
whether those four Congresswomen are socialists evoke the attacks 
2. Stefan Becket et al., Pelosi Launches Formal Trump Impeachment Inquiry, CBS NEWS, 
(Sept. 25, 2019, 1:41 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/trump-impeachment-pelosi-
launches-formal-impeachment-inquiry-of-president-donald-trump-wednesday/ 
[https://perma.cc/RK2C-6465] (“Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced the House is launching a formal 
impeachment inquiry into President Trump . . . . The speaker has long resisted calls from many 
progressive lawmakers to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president, but Democrats 
appear to have reached a breaking point . . . .”) 
3. Devan Cole, Trump Tweets Racist Attacks at Progressive Democratic Congresswomen, 
CNN (July 14, 2019, 8:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/14/politics/donald-trump-tweets-
democratic-congresswomen-race-nationalities/index.html [https://perma.cc/ADS4-9BWE] 
(“President Donald Trump used racist language on Sunday to attack progressive Democratic 
congresswomen, falsely implying they weren’t natural-born American citizens. Trump did not name 
who he was attacking in Sunday’s tirade but earlier this week he referenced New York Rep. 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez when the President was defending House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. A group 
of Democrats, who are women of color and have been outspoken about Trump’s immigration policies, 
last week condemned the conditions of border detention facilities. The group of women joining 
Ocasio-Cortez were Rashida Tlaib of Michigan, Ilhan Omar of Minnesota and Ayanna Pressley of 
Massachusetts.”). 
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endured by suffragists, who were maligned as socialists and atheists.4 So 
there is much work left to be done. 
The Nineteenth Amendment represented a significant moment in 
American history that held promise for changing the narrative around 
women exercising political power. But as we can see from contemporary 
politics, many of the same themes continue. So as part of our celebration 
of its Centennial, we should ask why the Nineteenth did not have more 
impact on the civil, political, and social status of women in our republic. 
The post-ratification story of the Nineteenth involved philosophical issues 
like the relationship between the individual and the state. It also 
implicated constitutional issues, including federalism, the scope of 
woman’s citizenship and the constitutional meaning of equality. And it 
was shaped by the intersection of race, gender and class. 
My forthcoming book from Oxford University Press, Constitutional 
Orphan: Gender Equality and the Nineteenth Amendment, offers an 
account of the constitutional development of the Nineteenth Amendment 
in the decade following its ratification in 1920. It examines how a thin 
conception of the Nineteenth emerged, and the role suffragists played in 
that story. In so doing, the book illuminates a piece of the puzzle as to 
why the Nineteenth had so little impact on women’s broader political, 
social and legal status as citizens.  
It was predictable that the implementation of an amendment 
expanding women’s power in a society structured around their legal, 
social and economic subordination would meet with substantial 
resistance. As institutional actors, Congress, state legislatures and the 
federal and state courts all held the power to implement the Nineteenth in 
a narrow or “thin” way or to give it a more robust or “thick” constitutional 
meaning. And each played a significant role in the thin constitutional 
conception of the Nineteenth that emerged by the end of the decade after 
its ratification. 
While Congress and the courts are significant sites of constitutional 
interpretation, social movements within civil society play important roles 
as well. Through their efforts to enfranchise American women, suffragists 
assumed such a role. Although they were not as powerful as other 
institutional actors, I argue that strategic choices made by suffragists in 
the wake of ratification also played a role in the limited development of 
the Nineteenth. The meaning of the Nineteenth was contested in the 
4. Liz Harrington, The Socialist “Squad” Does Not Like America: Take it From Them, 
https://townhall.com/columnists/lizharrington/2019/07/21/the-socialist-squad-does-not-like-
america-take-it-from-them-n2550365 [https://perma.cc/DTE7-8VSZ]. 
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decade after ratification. But the national suffrage organizations that had 
been instrumental in its enactment did not keep up a unified, sustained 
pressure on either Congress or the courts to resolve that process in favor 
of an expansive understanding of the Amendment. The promise that 
courts might interpret the Nineteenth as having an impact beyond voting 
was little realized, and it became a constitutional orphan, rarely cited after 
1930.5 
The book’s chapters lay out a brief history of the suffrage movement 
in the last years prior to ratification.6 They describe the immediate pivot 
of the NWP from the Nineteenth to the Equal Rights Amendment in 1921. 
There was a parallel mission-shift by NAWSA. In 1920, it became the 
National League of Women Voters (NLWV) and embraced social welfare 
legislation and voter education as its primary goals. As noted above, that 
shift in mission by both organizations accounts for the lack of a unified 
presence as questions arose in state courts about the meaning of the 
Nineteenth and in Congress about whether enforcement legislation was 
necessary. 
The suffragists’ choice to shift goals did not mean that they were 
absent from sites of potential constitutional interpretation and 
enforcement, like Congress and state legislatures. They were doing other 
work in those sites, lobbying for the reform of discriminatory state laws 
and for the proposed Equal Rights Amendment or social welfare 
legislation. Much of that work inured to the benefit of women. So my goal 
is not to suggest that the choices they made did not improve the lives of 
American women and move us closer to gender equality. They did. The 
NWP was instrumental in the introduction of six hundred bills in state 
legislatures aimed at striking down laws discriminating against women, 
three hundred of which were enacted. And the NLWV supported passage 
5. “Even though the quest for the vote spanned generations and provoked the most sustained 
dialogue about women’s position in the constitutional community that the nation has ever conducted, 
the Nineteenth Amendment has been utterly excluded from the constitutional canon.” Reva B. 
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 950 (2002) [hereinafter She the People]. 
6. PAULA MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN: GENDER EQUALITY AND THE NINETEENTH 
AMENDMENT ch. 1, (Ratification) (forthcoming 2020). Professor Tracy Thomas gave a 
comprehensive summary of the intellectual and political history of the full seventy-two year woman’s 
suffrage movement in her symposium presentation. Tracy Thomas, University of Akron School of 
Law, Address at The 19th Amendment at 100: From the Vote to Gender Equality: More Than the 
Vote: From Seneca Falls to ERA (Sept. 20, 2019). For that full seventy-two year history, see also, 
Tracy A. Thomas, More Than the Vote: The Nineteenth Amendment as Proxy for Gender Equality, 
STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5-8), 
https://www.uakron.edu/law/ccl/docs/19th-amend-conf-cle-materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY6X-
V3V9]. 
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of social welfare legislation like the Sheppard-Towner Act, a bill 
providing federal funds for better maternal and infant health. Rather, I 
suggest that by examining their strategic choices, we can better 
understand the under-development of the Nineteenth as an alternative tool 
for gender equality and women’s equal citizenship. 
The pervasive effect of white southerners’ concerns about states’ 
rights and their fear of giving African American women the vote, also 
played a pivotal role in truncating the effect of the Nineteenth. As always, 
race, gender and class have a significant impact on how law develops. The 
Nineteenth Amendment was no different, with race and the legacy of the 
Civil War playing a central role in its constitutional development. 
Southern resistance to giving women the vote was, in large part, 
connected to the fear of a “Second Reconstruction” and the specter of 
enforcement legislation, akin to that passed and implemented in the wake 
of ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.7 My book 
documents the initially strong, and later minimal, at best, effort by 
suffrage organizations to support the passage of Congressional 
enforcement legislation, which was introduced pursuant to the section two 
of the Nineteenth but which was never enacted.8 Those groups also chose 
not to join the efforts of African American suffrage leaders like Ida B. 
Wells-Barnett and Mary Church Terrell, the National Association of 
Colored Women’s Clubs (NACWC) and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in responding to voter 
suppression in the South with litigation and legislation. This reluctance to 
support enforcement legislation and judicial challenges to voter 
suppression was fueled, in part, by racism. But it was also fueled by the 
NWP’s perception that it needed white southern support for its new 
federal amendment—the Equal Rights Amendment. And that it needed 
similar support for state legislation that removed the legal disabilities of 
women. 
The leadership of the NWP included a number of experienced 
women lawyers like Florence Kelley, general secretary of the National 
Consumers League (NCL). Kelley had deep roots in strategic, test-case 
litigation, like Muller v. Oregon, which upheld protective legislation for 
7. In her symposium presentation, The Nineteenth Amendment: The Fourth Civil War
Amendment, Professor Kimberly Hamlin also discussed the role that white southern concerns around 
the Fifteenth Amendment played before enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment. Kimberly Hamlin, 
Miami University, Address at The 19th Amendment at 100: From the Vote to Gender Equality: The 
19th Amendment: The Fourth Civil War Amendment? (Sept. 20, 2019). See also, KIMBERLY HAMLIN, 
FREE THINKER: HELEN HAMILTON GARDENER’S RADICAL PURSUIT OF EQUALITY AND THE VOTE 
(forthcoming 2020). 
8. MONOPOLI, supra note 6, at ch. 3, (Enforcement Legislation). 
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women workers.9 Both the NWP and NAWSA also had an extensive 
political infrastructure, developed over decades of successful lobbying of 
Congress and state legislatures. The NWP and NAWSA (through its 
successor, the NLWV) could have chosen to work more closely with the 
NACWC and the NAACP, whose founders include white NWP members 
like Kelley and Mary White Ovington. Such a unified effort could have 
focused on pushing enforcement legislation out of Congress and bringing 
cases under such legislation in federal courts, challenging state barriers to 
African American women voting. Even with such unified pressure, it is 
questionable whether Congress would have enacted enforcement 
legislation, given the political power of white southern politicians. But 
such a federal forum, created by enforcement legislation, might have 
produced the equivalent of a case like Strauder v. West Virginia or Neal 
v. State of Delaware which required states to allow newly enfranchised
African American men to serve on juries under statutes enacted pursuant 
to the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.10 Such cases would have created an opportunity for federal 
courts to consider Congressional intent in the context of the broad, anti-
subordination discourse around woman suffrage in the seventy-two years 
preceding ratification of the Nineteenth. While those courts may not have 
given the Nineteenth a thicker meaning than simply “a nondiscrimination 
rule governing voting,”11 such federal litigation might have engendered 
9. 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908). 
10. See, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (in which the court reversed the
decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court, holding that a state statute that only allowed white male 
persons to serve as jurors was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection 
clause and affirming the power of Congress to enact enforcement legislation pursuant to the fifth 
clause of the Fourteenth. In dicta, the court unfortunately also stated that states could continue to 
exclude jurors based solely on sex.); Neal v. State of Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (in which the 
court affirmed Strauder and invoked the Fifteenth Amendment as well as the Fourteenth.) In his 
dissent, Justice Field argues that the fifth clause of the Fourteenth did not give Congress the authority 
to enact, “the fourth section of the act of March 1, 1875, c. 114” providing that no citizen should be 
denied the right to serve on a jury due to race, color and previous condition of servitude. Id. at 404-
405. In analyzing Strauder, Professor Steven Calabresi and Attorney Julia Rickert note that, while 
“[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has never drawn a connection between the right to vote and the right to 
serve on a jury,” some scholars have suggested it would be “senseless” to conclude that the 
Constitution protected the most important political right—voting—but did not protect a lesser 
political right like jury service. See Steven G. Calabresi and Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex 
Discrimination, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 77-78 (2011) (proposing an original public meaning interpretive 
approach to the Nineteenth Amendment.) There was no similar federal enforcement legislation 
pursuant to section two of the Nineteenth, which could have ensured a uniform conclusion by all state 
courts that considered the question of whether voting was co-extensive with jury service. 
11. This is the way Professor Reva Siegel describes the thin conception of the Nineteenth that 
emerged by the end of the decade following ratification. Siegel, She the People, supra note 5, at 1019-
22. 
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more judicial consideration of the relationship between the Nineteenth, 
the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments. This, in turn, would have 
provided more extensive judicial insight with which to reason about the 
civil, political and legal rights of women going forward.  
While suffragist advocacy around the Nineteenth slowed 
substantially after ratification, the cascade of constitutional questions 
triggered by its ratification did not. The first of these questions was, as a 
matter of federalism, how much power did the national government have 
to dictate voter eligibility criteria?12 This issue was implicit in the pending 
Congressional enforcement legislation described above. It was also 
implicated in state cases that parsed the impact of a federal amendment on 
state law like the general taxing power. Determining the precise boundary 
lines between federal and state sovereignty in this area was at the center 
of the state litigation around pre-conditions to voting, like poll taxes, that 
followed ratification of the Nineteenth. 
Federalism was also at the heart of cases which sought a 
determination of the impact of the Nineteenth on state laws that regulated 
political rights like jury service and holding public office.13 Federal 
constitutional amendments, constructed like the Nineteenth, were 
generally presumed to be “self-executing” as a constitutional matter and 
were seen as preemptive of contrary state legislation or constitutional 
provisions. But there were widely disparate state court approaches to 
construction of the Nineteenth. Some courts adopted an expansive view 
of the Nineteenth, deciding that rights like jury service were 
“coextensive” with voting. Perhaps fearing the broad social change the 
Nineteenth signaled in the role of women in the family, the market, and 
the constitutional community, or its political impact on state sovereignty, 
other courts cabined the federal impact of the Nineteenth on state law.14 
12. See, e.g., Id. at 998-1003. 
13. Professor Elizabeth Katz gave a comprehensive history of the public office cases, before
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, in her symposium presentation. Elizabeth Katz, 
Washington University School of Law, Address at The Nineteenth Amendment at 100: From the Vote 
to Gender Equality: Women’s Suffrage & the Right to Hold Public Office (Sept. 20, 2019). See also, 
Elizabeth D. Katz, “A Woman Stumps Her State”: Nellie G. Robinson and Women’s Right to Hold 
Public Office in Ohio, AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript on file with author). Katz 
notes that, “the [Nineteenth] amendment itself did not conclusively settle the question of women’s 
officeholding rights. Litigation and state constitutional amendments on this issue continued through 
the 1920s. But the amendment did provide the basis for eventually securing women’s officeholding 
rights.” Id. at 34, n. 167. 
14. In her presentation, Professor Reva Siegel discussed the historical evidence that the 
suffrage movement was heavily grounded in demands for changes in women’s legal subordination 
within the family. Reva Siegel, Yale Law School, Address at The Nineteenth Amendment at 100: 
From the Vote to Gender Equality: The Nineteenth Amendment & the Democratic Reconstruction of 
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They adopted a constrictive interpretation of its meaning, declaring it 
narrowly applicable to the ballot only. As noted above, unlike the 
legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth 
amendments, there was no federal enforcement legislation that forbid 
states from denying women the right to serve on juries or hold public 
office, based on their sex.15 Thus, state courts were left to their own 
construction of the scope of the Nineteenth on this question, untethered 
by any Congressional direction or constraints. 
The second constitutional question raised by the Nineteenth was the 
scope of woman’s citizenship under the federal Constitution. This 
question was inextricably intertwined with the question above about 
whether voting and jury service or voting and holding public office were 
coextensive. The same cases in which state judges parsed doctrines like 
the self-executing nature of constitutional amendments also demanded 
resolution of the question whether the Nineteenth went beyond simply 
voting and expanded women’s political rights.16 In the realm of defining 
women’s place in the constitutional order, judicial views about proper 
gender spheres undoubtedly drove some decisions about whether such 
rights were coextensive as a matter of statutory or constitutional 
interpretation. These decisions, in turn, often limited the expansion of 
women’s civil and political rights other than voting.17 The result was a 
continuation of women’s partialized citizenship for many decades after 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
Third, ratification of the Nineteenth implicated the definition of 
gender equality under the Constitution. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,18 
the Family: Recovering a Constitutional Tradition (Sept. 20, 2019). See also Reva B. Siegel, The 
Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129 YALE L.J.F. 450 (January 21, 
2020). Siegel argues that, “The debate about women voting in the decades after the founding centrally 
concerned the family. A male head of household was enfranchised to represent his wife, children, and 
other members of the household. A woman’s claim to vote was a challenge to this system of ‘virtual 
representation,’ and for this very reason, a claim for democratic reconstruction of the family.” Id. at 
452. 
15. MONOPOLI, supra note 6, at ch. 3, (Enforcement Legislation). 
16. MONOPOLI, supra note 6, at ch. 5 (Voting and Jury Service). Note that while jury service
has sometimes been characterized as a civil right, scholars have argued it is more akin to a political 
right. See, Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL 
L. REV. 203, 204 (1995). 
17. See, e.g., State v. James, 114 A. 553 (N.J. Err. & App. 1921) (holding the Nineteenth
applied only to voting and did not extend to jury service). However, other states courts came to a 
different result on the same question, applying a less constricted and more expansive construction of 
the Nineteenth. See, e.g. People v. Barltz, 180 N.W. 423 (Mich. 1920) (holding the Nineteenth 
Amendment extends to jury service as well as voting.) 
18. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel 
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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the United States Supreme Court invoked the Nineteenth when grappling 
with the constitutionality of protective labor legislation that regulated 
wages for women, but not for men.19 This issue was informed not only by 
gender, but by class in the first decades of the twentieth century. Many 
professional and upper-class neutrality feminists20 tended to support 
formal equality and a laissez faire view of the relationship between the 
State and the individual. Such a view favored limitations on the 
government’s power to intrude into spheres like the employer-employee 
relationship. These feminists saw protective legislation as a civil rights 
issue, in that such legislation limited a woman’s liberty to contract for her 
labor. Alternatively, other upper-class social feminists and working class 
women tended to embrace government intervention in such relationships, 
supporting laws that required minimum wages and maximum hours. 
Judges embracing a laissez faire approach were more likely to find 
unconstitutional those governmental regulations that interfered with or 
limited an individual’s right to negotiate a wage contract with an 
employer.21  
Much of the debate between the neutrality feminists and the social 
feminists that followed ratification of the Nineteenth split along these 
lines. It was focused on the potential impact of the proposed Equal Rights 
Amendment on the validity of protective legislation.22 Today’s courts are 
still grappling with how they should interpret statutes that protect against 
sex discrimination in the workplace, when the case involves differential 
19. These cases involved challenges to protective legislation that required employers to abide 
by maximum hour and minimum wage legislation. The United States Supreme Court upheld a 
maximum hour law in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). However, in 1923 the Court 
distinguished a minimum wage law as unrelated to the physical differences between men and women 
that justified its decision in Muller. And it found such a minimum wage law unconstitutional. See 
Adkins, 261 U.S. 525. 
20. I am using the term “neutrality feminist” to describe suffragists, like Alice Paul, who 
embraced the view that the Constitution should be interpreted to simply invalidate any “class 
legislation” that treated men and women differently in order to render equality. I use the term “social 
feminist” to describe feminists, like Florence Kelley, who believed that police power inherent in the 
Constitution to provide for the general health and welfare of the populace justified legislation that 
recognized the asymmetry of power based on both sex and class. Their position was that such 
legislation rendered equality of outcomes, a more substantive definition of constitutional equality. 
21. See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. 525, in which Justice Sutherland, a laissez-faire adherent who 
had advised Alice Paul on drafting the Equal Rights Amendment when he was a Senator, wrote the 
majority opinion striking down the District of Columbia’s minimum wage law. See, Siegel, She the 
People, supra note 5 at 1014. 
22. One way we might characterize the protective labor legislation cases, is as a debate about 
whether our Constitution merely guarantees a neutral or “formal” approach to equality, i.e., ensuring 
that women simply have the same opportunities as men. Or, whether our Constitution should be 
interpreted to ensure “substantive” equality—similar outcomes, taking into account differences 
between men and women.  
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treatment based on pregnancy. These cases raise the question of whether 
courts should apply law as if men and women are the same (a neutrality 
view) or different (acknowledging that effectuating women’s equality in 
the workplace may actually require different treatment of pregnant 
women.)23 This neutrality versus difference debate about the meaning of 
constitutional equality was at the heart of the battle for and against the 
Equal Rights Amendment. The neutrality feminists’ battle with social 
feminists and legal progressives, who opposed the Equal Rights 
Amendment, distracted either side from more extensive involvement in 
the post-ratification development of the Nineteenth.24 
We still have no federal Equal Rights Amendment today. If the 
former suffragists had made strategic choices that focused on more 
securely embedding the broad, anti-subordination norm of the Nineteenth 
Amendment in the federal and state legal fabric in the decade following 
its ratification, would later efforts to enact a new amendment and to build 
a constitutional jurisprudence of equality have come more quickly and 
have been more successful? Perhaps. But it is hard to know. Powerful 
actors like white southern politicians in Congress and state court judges 
who embraced strong state sovereignty views might still have succeeded 
in ensuring that a thin conception of the Nineteenth emerged. Those 
institutional actors who were concerned with the impact of a thicker 
meaning of the Nineteenth on the role of women in the family, the market 
and the political community would have resisted such an interpretation. 
But it was easier for those actors to do so without sustained pressure from 
the former suffragists to do otherwise. 
In her seminal article She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, 
Sex Equality, Federalism and the Family, Reva Siegel notes that, 
“[m]odern sex discrimination doctrine is built on this ‘thin’ conception of 
the Nineteenth Amendment—on the assumption that the Nineteenth 
Amendment is a nondiscrimination rule governing voting that has no 
bearing on questions of equal citizenship for women outside the 
franchise.”25 Siegel goes on to describe the United States Supreme Court’s 
approach to sex discrimination doctrine as one that ignores the 
23. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (interpreting the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See, also, 
Deborah L. Brake, On Not Having It Both Ways and Still Losing: Reflections on Fifty Years of 
Pregnancy Litigation under Title VII, 95 B. U. L. REV. 995 (2015). 
24. MONOPOLI, supra note 6, at ch. 7, (Defining Equality). Note that social feminists would
have been wary of encouraging a robust view of the Nineteenth, at least as applied to protective 
legislation, given the Adkins Court’s invocation of the Nineteenth in striking down a minimum wage 
statute for women. 
25. Siegel, She the People, supra note 5, at 1022. 
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constitutional history embodied in the debates leading up to ratification of 
the Nineteenth.26 She concludes that the Court’s reliance on the 
Fourteenth Amendment alone signals a view that the source of 
constitutional law governing the scope of woman’s citizenship is derived 
solely from an analogy to race.27 “These assumptions have given rise to a 
body of sex discrimination doctrine that is limited in legitimacy and acuity 
by the ahistorical manner in which it was derived from the law of race 
discrimination.”28 
My book offers an account of how that thin conception of the 
Nineteenth arose. And within that account, I examine the role played by 
national suffrage organizations, as institutional actors, in that story. With 
Congress, state legislatures and state and federal courts important sources 
of constitutional enforcement and interpretation, the suffrage movement 
faced powerful patriarchal agents that were, as a matter of institutional 
self-interest, likely inclined to limit the impact of women’s 
enfranchisement.29 Even if former suffragists had been more engaged in 
applying pressure to develop an expansive meaning of the Nineteenth, it 
is unlikely that a more robust interpretation would have emerged from 
such entrenched institutions, until it was expedient for them to embrace 
one.30 But the strategic choice made by the suffragists who secured final 
passage and ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment—to turn away 
from both lobbying for enforcement legislation and engaging in litigation 
that might have deepened its meaning as law—played a role in the thin 
conception that emerged in subsequent years.  
As Vicki Schultz has pointed out in the context of Title VII, when 
activists stop advocating, at best, the law fails to develop and, at worst, it 
26. Id.
27. Id. Siegel proposes a synthetic interpretation of the Fourteenth and the Nineteenth
Amendments based on a sociohistoric reading of the suffrage amendment in American constitutional 
history. Id. at 949, 952. 
28. Id. at 1022. 
29. Jeannette Rankin (R-Montana) was the first woman elected to Congress and the only one
to vote in 1918 on the text of the bill that later became the Nineteenth Amendment. See James J. 
Lopach and Jean A. Luckowski, JEANNETTE RANKIN: A POLITICAL WOMAN (2005) at 146. 
30. For example, President Wilson arguably decided to support a federal suffrage amendment, 
after having been opposed to one, only when it became essential to his war effort to do so. See Neil 
S. Siegel, Why the Nineteenth Amendment Matters Today: A Guide for the Centennial, 27 DUKE J. OF 
GENDER L. & POL’Y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9-10) (available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3461919 [https://perma.cc/9FAX-DXZS]) (describing Wilson’s shift from opponent to 
supporter of the federal suffrage amendment, suggesting reasons why he might have changed his 
position.); See, also, supra note 21, highlighting the connection between Alice Paul and Justice 
George Sutherland, whose robust view of the Nineteenth, as articulated in his opinion in Adkins, may 
be explained, in part, as a way to bolster his arguments for liberty of contract and substantive due 
process. 
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develops in a counterproductive way: “In areas of law where feminists did 
not campaign to challenge difference, or where they later took a less 
decisive or divided stance as the women’s movement began to fade and 
fracture, the absence of visible, unified feminist pressure permitted judges 
to retain or retreat back to older, biased views that attribute workplace 
inequality to women’s own preferences.”31 Schultz suggests that it is 
therefore important to examine, “not only the influence of a social 
movement overall, but also the rise of internal divisions within the 
movement and changes in its presence, visibility, and strength over time, 
in shaping legal developments.”32 Thus, the book also explores the post-
ratification divisions between the neutrality feminists and the social 
feminists, and how those divisions shaped the constitutional development 
of the Nineteenth. 
The book concludes by examining some of the ways that the 
Nineteenth could be used, either directly or synthetically with the 
Reconstruction Amendments, to reason differently about sex 
discrimination and women’s equal citizenship in the realm of voting rights 
and beyond.33 Given the current uncertainty about the status of the 
31. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1003
(2015). 
32. Id. at 1003. Some scholars have argued that a similar lack of support from women’s rights 
organizations for the private right of action under the Violence Against Women’s Act (VAWA) was, 
in part, to blame for its eventual demise at the hands of the United States Supreme Court. See Caroline 
S. Schmidt, What Killed the Violence Against Women’s Act Civil Rights Remedy Before the Supreme 
Court Did?, 101 VA. L. REV. 501, 530–33 (2015). 
33. MONOPOLI, supra note 6, at ch. 8, (The Nineteenth Amendment Today). See also Siegel,
The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, supra note 14, at 482-489 for 
several “ways in which an institutional understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment can guide the 
Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause” and citing Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion 
in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) as one that “invite[s] synthetic interpretation.” Id. 
at 484. See, also, Richard L. Hasen and Leah M. Litman, Thin and Thick Conceptions of the 
Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to Enforce It, GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 20), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3501114 
[https://perma.cc/3QLH-X625] (proposing “a litigation strategy premised on a revived Nineteenth 
Amendment within the scope of a cluster of new voting rights claims.”) One potential direct 
application is to state laws that require the payment of fees and fines by those convicted of felonies 
prior to reinstatement of voting rights, barriers to voting which often have a disparate impact on 
women given the gender pay gap. In her inspiring keynote speech, Nancy Abudu, Deputy Legal 
Director and Voting Rights Director at the Southern Poverty Law Center described the current 
litigation around such a state statute in Florida. Nancy Abudu, Southern Poverty Law Center, Address 
at The Nineteenth Amendment at 100: From the Vote to Gender Equality: Voting Rights Today (Sept. 
20, 2019). And Professor Michael Gentithes discussed the modern relevance of the Nineteenth 
Amendment to felony disenfranchisement in his symposium presentation. Michael Gentithes, 
University of Akron School of Law, Address at The Nineteenth Amendment at 100: From the Vote 
to Gender Equality: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Nineteenth Amendment (Sept. 20, 2019); 
Michael Gentithes, Felony Disenfranchisement & The Nineteenth Amendment AKRON L. REV. 
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proposed Equal Rights Amendment, revisiting the jurisprudential 
potential of the Nineteenth Amendment can shed light on how we may 
better secure women’s constitutional equality today. 
(forthcoming), https://www.uakron.edu/law/ccl/docs/19th-amend-conf-cle-materials.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QY6X-V3V9]. 
